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Commodity Chains, Unequal Exchange and Uneven Development 
 
Abstract:  
Research shows an uneven partition of value added along commodity chains between 
transnational firms and producers in developing countries. This paper briefly 
discusses how such a distribution occurs and how it leads to unequal exchange in 
trade. A North-South trade model reveals the uneven development consequences of 
this exchange. The terms of trade between North and South help maintain a gap in 
capital accumulation between the two regions. The model reveals that capital flows 
covering the trade deficit of the South with the North may help stimulate the 






One of the forces promoting trade liberalization has been the globalization of 
production, driven by transnational companies’ strategies to minimize production 
costs by relocating phases of production of commodities across borders. The 
commodity chain/value chain literature that has proliferated in the last twenty years 
studies the international relocation of phases of production from the microeconomic 
aspects of technology transfer, power relations, competition and concentration, quality 
standards etc. (e.g. Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Gereffi 1994a; Kenney and 
Florida 1994; Raikes et al. 2000; Schmitz and Knorriga 2000; Kaplinsky 2000). 
Studies reveal that “there has been a lack of correspondence between the growing 
global spread of economic activities associated with meeting global demands and the  
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incomes which arise from these activities” (Kaplinsky and Morris 2000, 41). The 
relocation of phases of production yields more than incremental advantages to the 
transnational companies; it entails conspicuous imbalances in the partition of the final 
value added of the commodities in favor of transnational companies and other 
institutions in the developed countries (in “the North”, i.e. the center of the world-
system), relative to the producers of the commodities located in developing countries 
(“the South” i.e. the periphery of the system).  
A few observations may serve to illustrate the argument. Gereffi (1989, 525) 
has observed that “[t]he distributors’ margins in the footwear industry in the United 
States … averaged 50% in the mid-1970s, but were closer to 60% for imported 
goods... .” In another study Gereffi reported that “[o]f the $75 billion spent on U.S. 
apparel imports … $25 billion corresponded to the foreign-port value of imported 
clothing, $14 billion to landing, distribution, and other costs, and $36 billion to the 
retailers’ average mark-up of 48 percent on imported goods… . The consumer’s retail 
price thus amounts to  three times the overseas factory cost for imported clothing” 
(1994b, 102-3). According to Feenstra, the export price of Barbie dolls produced in 
China and exported from Hong Kong is two dollars, and “[t]he dolls sell for about $10 
in the United States, of which Mattel earns at least $1, and the rest covers 
transportation, marketing, wholesaling and retailing in the United Sates. The majority 
of value-added is therefore from U.S. activity” (1998, 36). Kaplan and Kaplinsky 
(1999, 1794) have found that South African producers received 43 percent of the 
market value of canned peaches that they export to European markets. Chossudovsky 
(1998, 88-90) reports that five percent of the market value of shirts sewn in a 
Bangladeshi factory (from imported inputs) and marketed in the US accrued to 
Bangladesh in 1992. Shirts sewn in El Salvador for 18-19 cents a piece are sold in the  
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US for between 12-20 dollars (Figueroa 1996, 37, 39). According to Talbot (1997, 
18)
1 “from the early 1960s to the late 1980s roughly half of the total surplus generated 
along the entire [coffee] chain was retained in the producing countries”, but after 1986 
with the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement “there was a massive shift of 
surplus from the coffee producing countries to TNCs in the core, who used their 
market power to hold down the price of green coffee while inflating the price of 
coffee processed for final consumption.” Chossudovsky (1998, 87-88) indicates that 
only 10 percent of the value of coffee sold in the US accrued to the producing 
countries in the early 1990s. Dikmen (2000, 215, 243) found that in 1999 
manufacturers in Istanbul and Denizli (Turkey) producing garments for foreign firms 
earned between 20-25 percent of the price of their products in the final destination.  
Few studies of commodity chains devote attention to the macroeconomic and 
growth implications of this imbalanced partition of value added. Kaplinsky (2000, 
129) states the problem: 
…when production occurs in the context of falling global product 
prices, national accounting systems may reflect a growth in activity 
and value which does not correspond with the international purchasing 
power of this sectoral activity. The problem is particularly acute when 
decisions about national resoource allocation - affecting income 
streams over time  - are made without reference to global dynamics of 
returns to different activities in the chain. 
This paper presents a North-South trade model to study the problem described 
by Kaplinsky - the consequences of the partitioning of value added in commodity 
chains for the terms of trade between the North and the South and for the rates of 
                                                
1 Page number on internet version.  
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capital accumulation in the two regions. We first briefly discuss the determinants of 
the partition of value added in commodity chains in Section I.  In Section II a North-
South trade model is presented to study the macroeconomic implications of global 
value chains. Section III analyzes the interaction between capital flows from North to 
South that finance Southern trade deficits, and the unrequited real transfers (through 
value transfers along commodity chains) in the reverse direction, from the South to 
the North. Section IV studies how the value added partitioning contributes to uneven 
development in the longer term. The last section concludes.  
   
I. Commodity chains and unequal exchange 
Distribution of value added along commodity chains may relate to the fact that 
developing economies that have ‘opened up’ and increased their share in world trade 
have not been enjoying a concomitant increase in their share of world income 
(Kaplinsky 2000, 118-9). It is observed that “the share of the developed countries in 
world income (in current dollars) increased from less than 73% in 1980 to 77% in 
1999” (UNCTAD 2002, 51). The share of manufactures in developing countries’ 
exports has been increasing, displacing production based on unskilled labor in the 
North (Wood 1994). The share of the developed countries in world exports of 
manufactured goods has been declining, and their share in world manufactured value 
added has been increasing (UNCTAD 2002, 51-52).  
Evidence on the deteriorating terms of trade for developing countries may 
possibly be reflecting these trends. One investigation has found that, over 1979-1995 
the average price of manufactured exports of developing countries to the European 
Union increased annually by an average of 2.0 percent, while the average price of 
manufactured exports of the European Union to the developing countries increased  
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annually by an average of 4.2 percent, resulting in an annual average 2.2 percent 
deterioration of net barter terms of trade in manufactures over the fifteen years 
(Maizels 1996; UNCTAD 1996, 148). Another investigation reveals an average 
annual deterioration of terms of trade for non-oil exporting developing countries of 
1.3 percent over 1982-1988 and of 1.5 percent over 1989-1996 (UNCTAD 1999, 85).
2 
Although these trends are obviously not solely due to distribution along value chains, 
there is reason to suspect that pricing within value chains is involved. 
One explanation for this pricing imbalance and its possible terms of trade 
effects is the differences in competition and market power (analogous to the 
propositions by Prebisch and Singer in the context of the terms of trade deterioration 
between primary commodity exporters and manufactured goods exporters in the early 
post-war years). The export-led growth strategy adopted by an increasing number of 
developing countries in the last couple of decades has pitted millions of producers in 
manufacturing and services in the South and their governments against each other in 
competition for subcontracting orders and foreign investment by reducing production 
costs, mainly by devaluing labor
3, natural resources and public services (through 
fiscal incentives). By contrast the Northern transnational companies
4 that decide on 
the locations of production do not face such stiff competition thanks to their 
concentration in the sectors and to their control over technology, financial resources, 
marketing skills and access to Northern markets. Hence the transnationals are in a 
stronger position to control their purchase and sales prices (Gibbon 2001, 351; Fitter 
                                                
2 This evidence does not exclude the possibility that some developing countries may experience an 
improvement in their barter terms of trade as they increase their manufactured exports (Athukorala 
2000). 
3 The competition to reduce labor costs is conducted by compelling workers to devise ways to survive 
on low real wages (moonlighting, sending children to work, increasing women’s home production etc.) 
or by employing people (e.g. peasants) who already produce their essential means of subsistence and 
are willing to do manufacturing at home in their villages for low wages (Föbel (1988) provides a 
general framework; Thongyou (2003) studies an instance of rural sub-contracting). 
4 Northern because the great majority of TNCs are based in and owned by shareholders in the 
developed countries (Nolan 2003).  
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and Kaplinsky 2001, 24-27).
5  Moreover, the concentration of global market power 
appears to be on an increasing trend in many sectors (Nolan 2003, 302-310).  
The resultant high returns to these ‘lead firms’ organizing global production are 
analyzed as rents. Kaplinsky and Morris list the various forms of economic rents, 
some endogenous and some exogenous to the chains, arising from “differential 
productivity of factors (including entrepreneurship) and barriers to entry (that is, 
scarcity)”(2000, 26).
6 They explain the most crucial barrier in the following words:  
  … perhaps one of the most important factors explaining patterns of  
global inter-country income distribution, are controls against 
immigration. It is for this reason that incomes in rich country 
supermarkets are higher than those in the East African farm producing 
the vegetables they sell. The supermarkets themselves have to be located 
in rich countries, but the wages of these workers are protected by 
immigration controls and are defined by the incomes of workers in the 
broader economy which result from complementary economic activities 
external to the chain. (Kaplinsky and Morris 2000, 43). 
The restrictions on international mobility of labor, unskilled labor in particular, 
comprise (literally) an entry barrier into Northern labor markets which sustains the 
spatial segmentation of world labor markets. This barrier explains the wage 
differences between labor of comparable qualifications between the North and the 
South, differences which are an important source of rent in commodity chains.  
                                                
5 Even small global corporations that outsource production in developing countries have the clout to 
“keep production costs as a low percentage of the retail prices of products” by switching between 
producers on the basis of price, and thanks to their “exclusive power to  place the product in the 
market” (Clark 1993, 314). 
6 These are enumerated as technological rents, human resource rents, organisational rents (superior 
forms of internal organization), marketing rents (related to marketing capabilities and brand names), 
relational rents (having superior quality relationships with suppliers and customers), natural resource 
rents, policy rents (related to government support or efficiency), infrastructural rents (access to high 
quality infrastructural inputs) and financial rents (Kaplinsky and Morris 2000, 28).  
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In addition to the suppression of production costs, competition for subcontracts 
and for other forms of cooperation with TNCs is also conducted through competitive 
undervaluation of developing countries’ currencies vis-à-vis the reserve currencies. 
Comparison of exchange rates and purchasing power parities reveals that the market 
dollar exchange rates of the national currencies of countries in the South exhibit a 
regular tendency to remain above their dollar purchasing power parities (in other 
words, the market exchange rates undervalue these currencies) (Köhler 1998; Köhler 
and Tausch 2002, ch. 2). The purchasing power parity of a currency is calculated by 
comparing the local currency cost of a comprehensive basket of goods and services in 
that country and its dollar cost in the United States. Hence the purchasing power 
parity of a currency with the US dollar is the ‘fair’ rate such that a certain sum of 
money can purchase similar goods (close substitutes) in equal quantities in the United 
States and the other country if conversion between the currency and dollars is done at 
this rate. If the computed dollar purchasing power parity of the currency of a 
developing country is one half that of the market exchange rate for the dollar, then 
that country’s exports to the US will earn roughly one half of the value of those 
exports in the US market, implying that roughly one half of the exports are 
unrequited.  
The market dollar exchange rates of the currencies of the high-income OECD 
countries appear not to diverge from their dollar purchasing power parities by 
proportions comparable to those of developing country currencies. Hence it appears 
that trade between the developing countries and the other high-income OECD 
countries also involves unrequited transfers.
7 In other words, producers in the South 
receive for their exports to the North remuneration that is below the value of their 
                                                
7 Kaplinsky and Morris also opine that purchasing power parities are the most appropriate measure to 
use when analyzing distribution along value chains (2000, 83).  
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exports in Northern markets by greater differences than can be attributed to transport 
and distribution costs.  
Köhler (1998, 150; also in Köhler and Tausch 2002, 50) found a negative 
correlation between the exchange rate distortion and the per capita GDP for 120 
countries in the year 1995; i.e. a positive relationship between the exchange rate 
distortions and the poverty of nations.
8 In Köhler’s estimation for 1995 the 
unremunerated part of exports of non-OECD countries to the OECD countries 
amounted to 8 percent of the GNP of the importing OECD countries, and to 24 
percent of the GNP of the exporting non-OECD countries (1998, 162). The same 
estimation for 1993 yielded a transfer equal to 5.7 percent of the GDP of the OECD 
countries and to 21.2 percent of that of the non-OECD (Köhler and Tausch 2002, 57).  
These exchange rate distortions may be associated with the policy switch to 
convertibility and international financial integration among developing countries. 
Such policies induce a strong demand for the reserve currencies in the developing 
countries as a store of private wealth (e.g. currency substitution) and in the form of 
official reserve accumulation to ward off balance of payments crises that short-term 
capital flows are prone to wreak.
9 Thus financial deregulation policies and export 
competition converge to generate exchange rate configurations that facilitate skewed 
distributions of value added along commodity chains. 
Thus the competitive suppression of production costs and the undervaluation of 
currencies relative to their purchasing power parities are two methods of competition 
                                                
8 The correlation was between GNP per capita in 1995 US dollars (in market exchange rates) and the 
distortion factor. The latter was calculated as the quotient of GNP per capita in 1995 ‘international 
dollars’ to GNP per capita in 1995 US dollars (i.e. per capita GNP in dollars by the market exchange 
rate)(Köhler 1998, 150). 
9 Patnaik (2002) provides a theoretical argument for and evidence on a secular tendency for the real US 
dollar exchange rate of developing country currencies to rise, which corresponds to a dynamic 
tendency for these currencies to become increasingly undervalued with respect to their purchasing 
power.  
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in the South that make the imbalanced partition of value added with the North 
possible and provide goods manufactured in the South to the North at prices well 
below their values in Northern markets. The suppression of wages in the South can be 
conceived in terms of Southern goods and services. The exchange rate distortion, on 
the other hand, reduces Southern incomes (wages and profits) in terms of Northern 
goods and services.  
The next section presents a model aiming to shed light upon the macroeconomic 
and growth consequences of developing countries’ integration into world trade on the 
basis of wage suppression and exchange rate distortion. It follows the tradition of 




II. A North-South trade model 
A. The North 
We consider a world comprising two groups of countries or regions, the North 
and the South. The North produces a composite good that can be used for 
consumption or for investment. National product is distributed as profits and wages 
among two social classes, capitalists and workers. Northern capitalists and workers 
save a given proportion of their profit and wage incomes. 
The macroeconomic balances in the North can be written  
Xn = Cn + In + En - Mn                                         
(1) 
where Xn is the national product of the North, Cn is aggregate consumption, In is 
aggregate investment, En  is the  exports of the North to the South; Mn is the 
importation from the South organized by transnational companies. These imports  
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from the South displace some economic activities in the North and hence appear in its 
macroeconomic balance with a minus sign. The volume of imports is linked to the 
level of Northern output: 
Mn =  m Xn                              
(2) where we treat m as exogenous, determined largely by trade policies and 
transnational companies’ production strategies.  
Consumption in the North is a function of national income: 
Cn =  c Xn                                      
(3) 
where c is the average propensity to consume. 
The price level in the North is determined by: 
Pn = (1 + t )(Pn wn an  + mPs) .                             
(4) 
Pn is the unit price of the Northern output, t the mark-up rate, an  the labor-output 
ratio, wn  the real wage of a unit of labor. t and wn are exogenously given. m is the 
input coefficient for the imported input and Ps is its unit price. 
Imperfect competition among Northern firms enables them to price their goods 
applying a mark-up on their unit production costs. Production costs include wages and 
inputs imported from the South. These imported inputs may be finished goods or 
semi-finished goods. They may include payments for the assembly in the South of 
components imported from the North into commodities which are then re-exported to 
the North. The market price of output in the North comprises the cost of such imports 
plus value added (profits and wages) accruing to Northern importers, transporters, 
manufacturers, wholesale dealers, retailers, advertisers and other commercial services 
(part of which is mere ‘conceptual value-added’ realized by creating brand images  
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and marketing -Knutsen 2003, 231). Note the dual nature of these imports: they 
displace Northern productive activity because they could have been produced there, 
but they also enter a “value chain” and generate incomes in the North because of 
production cost differentials. 
The balance of payments of the North is  
Pn En – Ps Mn – Pn H = 0                                  
(5) 
where H is the exogenously determined trade surplus of the North in real terms.  
Aggregate investment in the North is determined by the profit rate and the 
capacity utilization rate: 
( ) n n n
n
n u r g
K
I
, = .                                             
(6) 
rn is the profit rate and un  (= Xn/Kn) is the capacity utilization rate. Kn represents the 
Northern capital stock, given in the short term, and also its productive capacity
10. The 
profit rate is calculated as: 
rn =   ( )
n n
n s n n n n n n
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(7) 
We have now seven equations with eight unknown variables: Xn ,Cn, In, En, 
Mn, rn, Pn and Ps. With the determination of Ps the macroeconomic balance of the 
North should be determined. 
Aggregate saving generated in the North is  Xn - Cn = In + En - Mn. Expanding 
this expression with substitutions from equations (1), (3) and (5) yields: 
                                                
10 This assumption merely helps avoid encumbering the notation with the addition of a fixed technical 
output-capital ratio.  
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(8)  The left hand side of (8) shows the total disposable saving of the North, which 
comprises the saving transferred from the South to the North through the unrequited 
part of imports, and the domestic saving of the North. The right hand side shows the 
Northern disposal of the saving. 
Substituting (6a) in equation (8) and dividing by the capital stock Kn, the 
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(9) 
where h = H/Kn. The capacity utilization rate un
* that satisfies this equation balances 
output and aggregate demand in the North. Taking the derivative with respect to the 
























                            
(10) 
where gni  represents the partial derivative of gn with respect to the ith argument. 
Stability requires that saving should be more responsive to changes in the Northern 
capacity utilization rate compared to investment. We assume this stability condition 
holds, so the Northern economies tend towards their macroeconomic equilibrium. 
 
B. The South 
The South produces an output which its workers and capitalists consume and 
which is also exported. This output cannot be used for investment. The South’s 
investment depends entirely on importation of Northern products.  
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The capitalists in the South save a part of their profit incomes. They allocate 
part of their consumption expenditure to imported Northern goods.  Workers do not 
save and do not consume imported goods. 
The price of the Southern output is determined by costs of production
11 : 
Ps = (1 + e)Ws as.                                 
(11) 
Ws is the given nominal wage in the South, as is the  labor-output ratio and e is 
a given distribution parameter showing profits. It should be noted that this price 
formulation does not necessarily imply oligopolistic pricing, but a stable distribution 
of income between wage earners and profit earners in the South.
12 
The macroeconomic balance of the Southern group of countries can be 
written: 
Ps Xs = Ws as Xs + (1 – ss) j e Ws as Xs + Ps Mn                   
(12) 
where ss is the Southern capitalists’ saving rate and j is the share of the Southern 
output in their consumption. The terms on the right are the Southern workers’ 
consumption, the Southern capitalists’ consumption of the domestic output, and 
exportation to the North respectively. 
                                                
11 It is usual for such models to be closed by assuming that the South has a constant level of output Xs 
determined by the productive capacity of the economy, and that changes in the price of the output Ps 
balance supply and demand (cf. Taylor 1981, Dutt 1992). This modelling seems to describe primary 
commodity prices which are more flexible compared to those of manufactured goods, and a primary 
commodity supply linked to a stable natural resource base. Recent post-Bretton Woods crises in the 
‘emerging markets’ that resulted in severe contracions give grounds to question the assumption of 
stability of capacity utilization and of real GDP in many developing countries whose exports include 
manufactures and services. 
12 If the share of profits in national income is a stable fraction ￿ = (PX – WaX)/PX,  then the price 
equation (11) merely implies a distribution of value added by the rule P = (1/(1-￿))Wa (cf. Dutt 1992, 
1161, eq. 5). In our model the share of profits in national income is  ￿ = e/(1 + e).     
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Adding equations (11) and (12) to (1)-(7) and the unknown Xs to the 
previously introduced eight endogenous variables makes the number of equations and 
endogenous variables nine.  
The solution of (12) for Xs yields a multiplier relationship (13) for the only 
autonomous expenditure in the demand for the Southern output which happens to be 
exports to the North.
13 




























                   
(13) 
Let us abbreviate the multiplier in parenthesis as ￿ . Clearly 
e ¶
¶a







 is positive. A redistribution of income in favor of the social class 
that is able to save, a rise in the saving propensity of this class and a decrease in its 
preference for domestic consumer goods all make for reducing the multiplier, and 
hence reduce Southern output for any given level of autonomous expenditure. 
Substituting from  (2), (3) and the definition of un, (13) can be written Xs = 
￿munKn. Let us define the Southern capacity utilization rate as us = Xs/Ks, and the ratio 
of capital stocks (hence of productive capacities) as  l  = Kn/Ks. The latter can be 
taken as constant in the short term. Then one can formulate the dependence of 
Southern economic activity on Northern economic activity: us = ￿ml  un. The 
business cycles in the North generate similar cycles in the South through the linkage 
of economic activities in the short run.  
                                                
13 The inclusion of other items of autonomous expenditures in the South would merely encumber the 
notation without providing any additional insights.  
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Capital formation in the South is determined by the supply of investment 
goods from the North: 
n
s s s s
n s P
X a eW s j
E I
) 1 )( 1 ( - -
- = .                             
(14) 
En is total exports of the North to the South. The second term on the right hand side of 
(14) is the part of imports from the North allocated to Southern capitalists’ 
consumption. 
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(15) 
The dependence of the Southern investment rate on Northern economic 
activity is obvious (Xs itself is influenced by Xn). If we assume that Southern 
expenditure (in terms of Southern goods) on the consumption of imported goods does 
not exceed the South’s exports, the expression in brackets on the right hand side of 
(15) will be positive. In that case, deterioration of the South’s terms of trade 
constrains its capital formation.  The positive effect on Southern investment of the 
Southern capitalists’ saving rate and the negative effect of Southern capitalists’ 
preference for imported consumption goods are also apparent. The trade surplus of the 
North with the South also enhances the South’s investment. Only in the perverse 
situation where the real expenditure on consumption of imported goods exceeded the 
South’s exports (i.e. when the bracketed term in (15) were negative) would a 
deterioration of the Southern terms of trade enhance the investment possibilities for 
the South. In that case, the consumption of Northern imports exceeds what is imported 
by Southern export earnings, so that the deterioration of the terms of trade makes a  
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positive impact on Southern investment by reducing the consumption drain on 
investment resources provided by the Northern trade surplus. 
The Southern terms of trade are affected by the distribution and productivity 
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(16) 
  Thus the South does not appear to have an influence over the terms of trade. 
 
III. Global macroeconomic interactions 
The South’s exports to the North include goods that compete with Northern 
goods  of market value Pn. Then equation (4) partially reflects the (mostly 
‘conceptual’) marking up of value added in the North on Southern goods imported 
cheaply for Ps and the market value of which is Pn in the North. In the extreme 
(stylized) case where all of Southern exports are cheap substitutes for Northern goods, 
the money value of the South’s loss from this unequal trade is (Pn – Ps)Mn. With 
substitutions from (3) and (16), this loss in terms of Northern goods is found to be:  
.
1



















                 
(17) 
The possible consequences of a decline in Ps through competition or of its 
increase through collective action can be analyzed by dividing the pricing equation (4) 
of the North by Pn: 
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(18)  
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The terms on the right in (18) show respectively the shares of Northern labor, 
of the South and of Northern capitalists in the unit value of Northern output. A 
gradual decrease in Ps may induce (and be balanced by) a proportionate increase in m. 
Or it may be reflected in higher value added in the North (higher real wages and/or 
profits). A hike in Ps can be neutralized by an increase in Pn or a reduction of imports. 
Otherwise Northern wages or profits would have to accommodate for the increase in 
import prices. The evidence summarized in Section I suggests that Pn has been 
actually increasing at a higher rate than Ps, and that this deterioration in Southern 
terms of trade is balanced by increases in m and in Northern value added. 
Up to this point we have been focussing on unrecorded real transfers from the 
South to the North arising from the terms of trade consequences of unbalanced pricing 
power along commodity chains. Now the recorded Northern trade surplus with the 
South implies real transfers from North to South. So the question naturally arises as to 
how these flows interact, and whether there is a causal relation between them.  
Multiplying (9) by Kn, the Northern macroeconomic balance equation showing 
saving and investment can be converted into 
) H u u
t
t
g K X c m
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(19) 
Taking total differentials in (19) with respect to Xn and H (and invoking the 
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(20)  
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which is positive (contingent on the stability assumption for the Northern economies 
shown in Equation (10)). More importantly, (20) may be smaller than or greater than 
one.  
This last equation yields a crucial finding. Since unrequited transfers to the 
North increase with expanding Northern output and since the Northern trade surplus 
increases Northern output, the trade surplus of the North with the South may be 
priming the pump for unrequited real transfers from South to North.
14 
The relative magnitudes of H (North-South transfer) and [(Pn–Ps)/Pn]Mn  
(South-North transfer), i.e. the direction of the net transfers, depends on the 

















































                                  
(21) 
The expression in brackets on the right in (21) is positive by the stability 
assumption. It is multiplied by two positive coefficients each of which is smaller than 
one. The multiplier on the right hand side of (21) may be smaller or greater than one. 
If it is smaller than one, a unit increase in the North’s trade surplus stimulates imports 
such that the expanded trade with the South compensates for part of the surplus 
through an increase in unrequited transfers, a compensation which is not recorded. If 
the multiplier is greater than one, a unit increase in the North’s trade surplus may 
stimulate imports such as to expand the unrequited transfers from the South by more 
than one unit of Northern goods. 
 
                                                
14 Somel (2003, 929-30) presents an empirical calculation of unrequited transfers exceeding current 
account deficits for a single country.   
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IV. Uneven development 
In the long term steady state the ratio of capital stock of the North to that of 
the South will depends on their capital growth rates. 
The capital growth function for the South (corresponding to (6) for the North) 
is derived by dividing (15) by Ks: 
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where a circumflex denotes growth rate. Substituting therein from (22) and from (6a), 
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In the long run we assume that the capacity utilization rates in both North and 
South fluctuate around long term averages, which we take to be given. Hence the long 
term analysis need focus only on the connection between l ˆ and l  in (23). The 
solution l
*  to the equation  0 ˆ = l  is the steady state ratio of the Northern capital 
stock to that of the South. If the coefficient of l  on the right hand side of (23) is 
negative, the steady state equilibrium l
*  is stable. It will be stable unless the South 
runs a surplus in its trade with the North (a negative valued H) which exceeds its 
exports to the North in real terms ((Ps/Pn)mXn). 
A higher propensity to import from the South (more liberal Northern import 
policies) increases the ratio of Southern capital stock to the Northern. 
The increase in Northern real wages (cf. (16)) raises the Northern terms of 
trade and increases the capital stock ratio in favor of the North (assuming, again, that 
Southern expenditure on the consumption of imported goods does not exceed the 
South’s exports (cf. (15) and (23)). Similarly, under the assumption of a stable 
capacity utilization rate in the North, (23) indicates that an increase in the Northern 
mark-up rate increases the growth rate of Northern capital and decreases that of the 
South through the terms of trade effect.  
If the liberalization of imports and pervasion of consumerist culture in the 
South abets increasing importation of non-essential consumption goods, this can 
contribute to the rise of the capital ratio in favor of the North (through a decrease of j). 
If the liberalization of the activities of domestic financial institutions paves the way 
for a continuous expansion of consumption credit, this may weaken the Southern 
saving effort (reducing ss) and contribute to raising the capital ratio. Should Southern 
mark-up rates benefit from the repression of wages in the South (an increase in e) this  
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income redistribution in favor of the classes with a higher propensity to consume 
imported goods will exacerbate the capital ratio in favor of the North.  
If the capacity utilization rates in the North and the South fluctuate around 
their respective long term averages, an increase in the capital ratio will be reflected in 
greater GDP gaps. If we consider that population growth rates are generally higher in 
the South relative to the North, then even a stable capital ratio (and a deteriorating 
capital ratio a fortiori) imply an widening gap in per capita incomes between North 
and South and an increasing global income polarization. 
Finally the case of a trade deficit of the North with the South merits 
consideration. According to the World Bank’s online data, low and middle income 
countries as a group have posted aggregate current account surpluses in the three 
years 2000-2002. In the model, if the North obliges the South to undertake stress 
exportation for debt repayment or exhorts it to grow by exporting, this reduces H (and 
h), increasing  the steady state capital ratio l
* and the  capital accumulation gap. If 
the North’s trade deficit with the South should rise to make h a sufficiently large 
negative value, the present model shows that it may render the system unstable and 
start an endogenous divergence process between the capital stocks in the two regions, 
Kn and Ks  (by equation (23)), entailing a continuous process of polarization. 
The model presented has an important limitation. The assumption that the 
Southern product enters a value-adding process in the North implies a rigid terms of 
trade between the Northern and Southern products that depends only on Northern 
distribution, productivity and import policy parameters (16). But Northern profits and 
wages may be endogenously enhanced by the endeavour of Southern producers to cut 
costs and devalue their currencies. An investigation of such a causality would require  
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The commodity/value chain literature focuses mostly on how to improve the 
capability of developing country producers to upgrade their production activities and 
to increase their shares of value added along value chains. It has been suggested that 
global commodity/value chain studies may be an “embryonic theory of development” 
(Pelupessy 2000, 9). The macroeconomic assessment of the globalization of 
production presented above questions the validity of such a development perspective. 
The steady state of the North-South model presented above involves a steady 
growth of unrequited resource transfers from the South to the North. It implies equal 
rates of capital accumulation, a stable long term ratio in national incomes between 
North and South, and an increasing difference in incomes between the two regions (in 
absolute terms). Such a steady state appears socially untenable. Globalization of the 
mass media has made living and working conditions in the North the standard for a 
decent life, to which all societies compare themselves. The global income distribution 
of the steady state also implies that a large share of Southern exports must be 
perpetually aimed at Northern markets, which shores Northern transnational 
companies’ control over value chains.  
The theoretical steady state is based on the assumptions that the propensity to 
consume and their preference for imported Northern goods among the privileged 
classes in the South are constant. Deterioration in these variables may spell an 
increasing divergence between Northern and Southern capital accumulation levels and  
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incomes. The incidence of cyclical slowdowns or contractions in the Northern 
economies also falls heavily on the South, as the transnational firms are able to pass 
costs of adjustment onto the producers in the developing countries.  
The trends question the wisdom of envisaging export-led growth and 
upgrading within commodity chains as the main thrust of a development strategy for 
developing countries. Moreover, such a general strategy may entail a fallacy of 
composition, as intensified efforts to enhance productivity, quality, flexibility, 
punctuality etc. on the part of the producers in developing countries would probably 
result in the producers delivering goods at lower prices and higher quality to Northern 
transnational companies with more flexible and punctual accommodation to changing 
orders, but would not provide any substantial changes in the market power relations 
between Northern firms and Southern producers and hence in the partition of value 
added along commodity chains.  
These considerations suggest that the developing countries should complement 
the endeavor to improve their positions in commodity chains with greater effort to 
reduce their dependence on export earnings through commodity chains. The latter 
would involve greater exertion to learn to produce essential imports, to manage the 
allocation of foreign exchange earnings more judiciously for the developmental 
objective and to increase trade among developing countries. Finally, it would involve 
more international effort to reform the structures of the global trade and financial 
system that favor the profitability concerns of transnational companies over the 
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